The Arms Control Association (ACA) says that it has obtained a copy of the U.S. proposal to exempt India from existing nuclear trade restrictions maintained by the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It has subsequently released it on its website and then it has presented “its own views” which run contrary to the majority of the free world. The claims made by ACA are flawed and twisted.

ACA claims that “The proposed rule change would allow India to acquire nuclear technology and material previously off limits to it because of India’s misuse of past nuclear imports for peaceful purposes to conduct a nuclear explosion in 1974 and refusal to allow full-scope international safeguards.” While it doesn’t explain what those technologies are, ACA has completely twisted the misuse part. Both statements are a general sloganeering. India posses a range of technologies that is sufficient for sustaining its nuclear industry and ambitions. What ACA needs to introspect is that, would India have closed its nuclear shops if the Indo-US Civilian nuclear deal was not initiated? While ACA claims that India misused the imports, it has failed to prove it.

The next claim made by ACA is that “Generally speaking, any India-specific exemption from NSG guidelines would erode the credibility of the NSG’s efforts to ensure that access to peaceful nuclear trade and technology is available only to those states that meet global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament standards. India has not agreed to abide by the standards and commitments expected of other responsible states, including full-scope IAEA safeguards, a meaningful Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement, a legally-binding ban on nuclear testing, and a halt to the production of fissile material for weapons.” India does meet the so called “global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament standards.” ACA has conveniently forgotten to mention the Indian export control laws, non-proliferation laws and non-proliferation record. NPT and CTBT are failed tools made up of countries which have no legitimate interest in nuclear weapons or the nations which have nuclear weapons and have exemptions. How many nuclear weapons states have will actually meet the criteria of ACA definition of “safeguards, legal test bans and halt of production of fissile materials”? In addition what little hey have signed, they have exit clauses. How different is from what India is seeking?

ACA claims that “The IAEA director-general has failed in his basic responsibility to ensure there is a clear understanding between the Indians and the IAEA that the agreement is consistent with IAEA standards and practices for terminating safeguards.” On one side ACA claims that India should adhere to IAEA and on the other hand ACA itself has no respect for the IAEA leadership or the combined intellect of member states for voting on informed issues like Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. The ACA release does not even tries to figure out its own version of what should have been the “standards for terminating safeguards.” This is where world will notice ACA’s own record on double standards.

ACA claims “The supply of foreign nuclear fuel to India’s civil nuclear sector would also free up India’s limited fuel supplies for use in its military production sector and allow India to increase its production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.” India manages its fissile material from its own reserves and the material is expected to multiply as the Thorium reactor start functioning. While thorium reactor will generate fissile material, it is also an answer to next generation of nuclear fuel after the world reserves of Uranium fall. ACA gives an impression that India would start producing nuclear weapons in bulk which is untrue. No nation produces nuclear weapon beyond its minimum deterrence needs.

ACA claims that “If, as India is demanding, supplier states agree to help India amass a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel or agree to provide lifetime reactor fuel supplies, the current NSG exemption would allow India to resume nuclear testing without fear of losing access to nuclear fuel supplies.” ACA as it survives in illusion would like India to surrender its achievements on a platter. Like mentioned above, Thorium reactors will anyway enable India to achieve all that ACA claims above.

ACA claims “Trade with India involving sensitive nuclear technologies (uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and heavy water production) and certain dual-use items on the NSG trigger list could also be used by India for weapons production purposes. Since IAEA safeguards cannot be relied upon to prevent the diversion or replication of these sensitive technologies for weapons-related purposes, the transfer of these items to India should be explicitly prohibited.” This is the second time that ACA disrespects IAEA and then suggests that India should adhere to full IAEA safeguards. May be ACA can make up its mind first. Besides, ACA should actually look at Indian nuclear capabilities with respect to weaponisation.

ACA points out to its own drafted sentence “very ambiguous language” in section 2, which in ACA’s point of view is ostensibly meant to outline what India has done that qualifies it for a special exemption from NSG guidelines. ACA also claims that “Section 3 would allow individual NSG members to engage in a full range of nuclear trade with India without any legally or politically meaningful requirement that would link nuclear trade with India to implementation and compliance with the commitments and actions mentioned in section 2.” ACA statement is more ambiguous than its claim on the section 2 they are implicating US of. Besides, quoting sources like armscontrol.org, ACA has little to show the futility of section 2. ACA fails to point out that the NSG members have their own nuclear non-proliferation and export controls. NSG is just a cartel and it does not force any member state to trade with India. Those states which want to trade may not see ACA’s sloganeering as national policy.

After IAEA, ACA discredits NSG by saying “To be effective, the NSG’s guidelines must establish clear and unambiguous terms and conditions for the initiation of nuclear trade and possible termination of nuclear trade with recipient states.” It’s a clear indication that ACA wants India to sign NSG terms when ACA itself has no respect for NSG.

One more section which an ACA comment is “Section 4 of the proposal would effectively give India a veto over future NSG decisions even though it is not a member of the NSG. It states that: “Participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India.” ACA expects independent India to accept all NSG conditions for free. ACA objections seem to be not realistic.

Organisations like ACA should shed its cold war era attitudes and reform itself to adapt to the evolving situations.